This is a guest post by MAROOSHA MUZAFFAR

After eight years of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s presidency, Iran elected to power the reformist leader Hassan Rouhani, 64, in elections held in June this year. On Sunday, August 4, he was sworn in as the President of Iran in a ceremony attended by dignitaries from at least 52 countries. Rouhani now holds a job that in the current political landscape of Iran entails, well, a lot of hard work. And his diplomatic skills that so many have already sung paeans to, will now be put to test. 

Rouhani has been seen as a “moderate” in the Western media and he himself repeatedly said during his campaigning that he will take the “moderate path.” Whatever that may mean! There is hope that he will bring in a different approach in dealing with the most pressing issues. Apart from the domestic issues—dying economy, rising inflation etc.—he has to take into special consideration Iran’s foreign policy as the head of the state. Of course the nuclear program is at the core of it. And because of the nuclear program, Iran faces severe economic sanctions from the West—and these sanctions have crippled her economy and diminished Iran’s currency, Rial.

Given his predecessor’s reputation in the West, Rouhani will be keen to do some damage control. As was expected, he reached out to the United States during his speech on Sunday. He made some careful comments:

“To have interactions with Iran, there should be talks based on an equal position, building mutual trust and respect, and reducing enmity.” He added, “I hereby say this explicitly, that if you expect a suitable response, you should talk to Iran with respect, not the language of sanctions.”

Reading into those comments in particular and his speech in general, one can be forgiven for thinking that Rouhani is in a tight spot right now. On one hand, he is a proud Iranian and does not want to be seen as a ‘softie,’ kowtowing to the U.S. (Also the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei will never allow kowtowing U.S.’s line.) But on the other hand, the sanctions have a devastating effect on Iran. As was pointed out by this Guardian piece, the sanctions don’t harm the leaders; they harm the people living in the country.

On his first press conference on Tuesday after the swearing-in ceremony, Rouhani again tried to reach out to the United States. He said: “We will not do away with the right of the nation.” (This is the proud Iranian talking.) “However, we are for negotiations and interaction. (Notice change of tone). We are prepared, seriously and without wasting time (back to being the proud Iranian), to enter negotiations which are serious and substantive with the other side.” He continued: “If the other party is also prepared like we are, then I am confident that the concerns of both sides will be removed through negotiations within a period which will not be very long.”

But are the two parties serious?

On July 31, 2013, just four days before Rouhani’s swearing in, U.S House of Representatives voted 400-20 a Bill (Nuclear Iran Prevention Act) to strengthen the U.S. sanctions against Iran. The Israeli PM praised the vote. Iran, obviously was not happy. The questions that arise: How will the Senate respond to those sanctions? Why hasn’t Obama administration responded so far to the House vote?

Rouhani was praised for choosing his cabinet carefully—having a mix of both conservatives and reformists—but will the Iranian Parliament approve of them? With so many power centers in the country, it sure is tough for the incoming president to do the balancing act. One thing is clear though: the final power in Iran lies with the religious supreme leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei. And who backed Rouhani for president.

But the biggest question is: will there ever be a breakthrough regarding Iran’s nuclear program? There are many factors that come into play while trying to answering that question. First, Iran’s nuclear program is the country’s pride. And they will not let go of that just because the United States wants them to. Their nuclear negotiator for the past six years Saeed Jalili, who was a presidential candidate as well for this year’s elections, said ahead of the talks in April (the talks failed) that “the world powers need to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium.” But are the world powers prepared to do that?

In March this year, in a speech on Navroz (Persian New Year), Khamenei reiterated that. To add salt to the wound, he called Americans, ‘our enemies.’ Ouch! Rouhani will be keen to not make statements that alienate the United States, although his comments on Israel did stoke a fire in the media. What, however, is interesting is the Israel equation. Ahmadinejad was known to make anti-Israel remarks. And Iran and Israel have never been on the same page. Israel plays a key role. And it’s been staunchly opposing Iran’s nuclear program. With lobbying bodies like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Rouhani will literally have to walk a tightrope.

Iran, a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has always maintained that enriching uranium for civil purposes is their “inalienable” right, which it is, and of all the signatories of the Treaty. They however are not ready for increased supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the suspension of nuclear program (which Rouhani, in his first post-election press conference pointed out—the days when Iran might consider suspension are over, he said.

But the United States is paranoid Iran might be developing the nuclear weapons. What fosters that paranoia about Iran’s nuclear program is the fact that Iran is trying to make a water reactor in Arak next year.

Former U.S. officials Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, authors of the book Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, say: “Washington’s unwillingness [to recognize the rights of Iran for enrichment] is grounded in unattractive, but fundamental, aspects of American strategic culture: difficulty coming to terms with independent power centers (whether globally or in vital regions like the Middle East); hostility to non-liberal states, unless they subordinate their foreign policies to U.S. preferences (as Egypt did under Sadat and Mubarak); and an unreflective but deeply rooted sense that U.S.-backed norms, rules, and transnational decision-making processes are meant to constrain others, not America itself.”

So that’s the hitch: Washington not recognizing Iran’s right to enrich uranium at all. And unless that changes, there can be no hope for a resolution anytime soon. The failure of talks at Almaty, Kazakhstan, earlier his year, is an indication —(in those talks, the P5+1 nations proposed, among many things, suspending the uranium enrichment program and increased supervision by IAEA). In fact for the past decade or so all the negotiations between Iran and West have failed. Both are adamant on their own stands. And the “moderate” Rouhani—who, lets not forget has Khamenei’s backing, can’t do anything out of the ordinary. He won’t and can’t go against the big boss, Khamenei who ultimately wields the ultimate power in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

However, this stalemate between Iran and the West begs this observation: when the United States has no problems with the nuclear programs of non-NPT states like India and Pakistan and Israel (Israel has been ambiguous about its nuclear program but this is interesting), why is it going after Iran, an NPT member (and North Korea, but that is a separate matter)?

In such a tricky situation, what should Rouhani do? If there is no breaking of ice between Rouhani and the West on Iran’s nuclear deal, it is not hard to guess what might happen next. Peace in Middle East will remain a pipedream.

Rouhani’s main goal will be the lifting of crippling sanctions. But how far can he go? How flexible is he? Will Khamenei allow any flexibility? Will U.S. send troops to Iran? A regime change maybe?

(Maroosha Muzaffar is a Fulbright scholar from Kashmir who has worked with The New Indian Express in New Delhi, currently at New York University specializing in long-form/narrative journalism.)