The following paper is a detailed examination of the current turmoil in the North-East in its historical context. It has been prepared by a team of activists from different communities of the North-East and is intended for wider discussion and dissemination.  

First released on June 1, 2023 by North-East Forum for International Solidarity (NEFIS)

1. Introduction

At present, there is an unprecedented social conflict raging in Manipur. The violence has affected all communities in the state. Over 100 people have been killed, 50,000 people are currently in more than 300 refugee camps and lacs have been displaced. Religious places, granaries, and homes belonging to the common people, especially those from the minority tribal communities have been burned. The minority community has a strong feeling of being persecuted. In reality, the lives and livelihoods of the labouring poor across communities have been lost. It is the women of all communities who have been the most vulnerable. To instigate conflicts among communities, fake news, and rumours were peddled by the communal groups which later became the pretext for the alleged lynchings and rapes of women. Miscreants and communal groups have conveniently sought revenge for incidents of violence faced by their respective communities by targeting and punishing those who are unconnected to the acts of violence for which ‘retribution’ is sought. A vicious, never-ending cycle of vengeful violence continues to erupt with the failure of the state to act against such miscreants.

The state government has failed to ensure peace and its actions have served to further pit the communities against each other. The mainstream Indian media largely ignored the events unfolding in Manipur. Sadly, the central government disregarded the gravity of the turmoil in the state. While the state was gripped by the crisis, the Prime Minister and Union Home Minister remained busy in electioneering. They addressed multiple rallies in the election-bound Karnataka, and even after the end of election campaigning, did not take concrete steps to address the crisis. The new Parliament Complex, supposed to be a symbol of democracy, was inaugurated in late May even as Manipur burned and the democratic structure in the state lay in shambles; a result of the anti-minority policies adopted in recent years by the BJP governments at the centre and in the state.

Amid the present crisis, there have been claims and counter-claims of various communities. A lot of people have died across community lines, and the majority of the common people across communities are grieved by the turmoil and wish to have peace brought in the state at the earliest. Unfortunately, tied to community attachments, the ability of a section of people to empathize with the general suffering has been numbed. Emotions are running high and are open to misuse. Community chauvinism, at present, is very intense. While we easily recognize the chauvinism of the other community so as to dismiss its genuine claims, we tend to evade the issue of chauvinism within one’s own community. Amid the prevailing turmoil, it is our pressing task to put all our endeavours to rebuild humanity and march forward towards justice and peace. The current moment beckons us to penetrate behind the smokescreen of claims and counter-claims to see the real aims of the government and the larger scheme behind the current crisis. The state government, instead of heeding the issues of the minority community, has succeeded in carving an anti-minority community feeling in the state’s majority community, Meitei/Meetei/Meithei community. The Kuki-Zomi-Chin tribal groups who mostly reside in the hills are being portrayed as encroachers, poppy growers, and illegal immigrants. This portrayal is not just directed towards a particular community but carries larger aims, the acquisition of the forests for various perceived and unperceived benefits to the Indian state and capitalists.

Manipur is part of the frontier region of India which is referred to as the North-East. Colonial and subsequent Indian state’s control over the local communities had far-reaching ramifications for both the internal and external dynamics. The colonial control meant that conflicts among and within local communities ceased to remain merely local. The ruling establishment forced them to mould their disputes, reactions, and claims in terms of emerging larger economic scenario and international strategic considerations. By drawing arbitrary regional and international boundaries, the erstwhile British Empire fractured this zone permanently, thereby gradually rendering economic and cultural ties forged through centuries of interactions untenable. Colonial economic pattern gradually imposed itself by integrating this area with the world economy. This is how the North-East in general and Manipur, in particular, was drawn into the vortex of the modern capitalist system. This incorporation of the North-East into the larger political and economic frame has fed the vicious cycle of underdevelopment in the region eventually leading to an intensification of unequal distribution of wealth and development within and among communities. In recent decades, the trend of expropriation of resources controlled by local communities has intensified. This is reflected in the fanfare with which the ‘Look East policy’ (now Act East policy) has been unveiled by the Indian state. It is now eyeing the immense potential for hydro-electricity, new mineral reserves and the possibility of developing commerce ties with ASEAN countries. This development should also be seen in the context of the rivalry between India and China to develop ties with South-East Asian countries.

The present efforts of the Union government and state government in Manipur to dominate the hills are to use the hills area for larger strategic design and to acquire forests rich in minerals and other resources for the corporate houses. Ruling elites at the helm of the affairs are keenly aware of the staunch resistance movements of common people and the existence of a long history of insurgency in the region. The success of the present endeavour of the ruling elites to dominate the hills is dependent on exploiting differences among the communities through divisive politics and garnering acceptance for its aims in the majority community. Thus, the state government has fallen back on the chauvinist forces amongst the majority Meitei community to legitimize its actions. Against this backdrop, it becomes imperative for all the progressive and democratic forces of different communities to understand the contours of the present crisis and to prepare the people for the task of justice for all, which alone can ensure the possibility of a lasting peace. The present study is an attempt to explore the issues related to the current crisis in Manipur in the most objective possible manner so as to transform the wider public opinion prevailing in the state.

2. How the present conflict unfolded?

The open conflict between the Kuki and Meitei communities started on May 3 when at the end of a solidarity march called by All Tribal Student Union Manipur (ATSUM) in various districts of Manipur, clashes erupted. The march was called by ATSUM against the recent order by the Manipur High Court which sought the recommendation of Scheduled Tribe (ST) status for the Meitei community by the state government to be expedited.

This recommendation if accepted by the Central government would be detrimental to the rights of the tribal communities. This is also the reading of the High Court order among the tribal communities of Manipur, especially the Kukis. The order of the High Court arrived in the backdrop of the already fragile relations between the valley-dwelling communities such as Meitei and the hill-dwelling communities such as Kuki and Naga. Prior to this order, the state government, which has a majority representation from the Meitei community and is headed by a Chief Minister who belongs to the majority community, had taken various steps that were outrightly directed against the tribal communities, especially the Kuki community.

One of the most contentious issues among the tribal communities is the loss of their land and cultural autonomy. The dominant opinion among the Meiteis is that modifying the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reform Act, 1961 (MLR and LR Act) would allow them to buy land in the hills, which is seen as a solution to the so-called land crunch in the valley areas. In fact, the law has already been tweaked to allow land in the hills to be taken over. This is made possible by the 1988 Amendment of the Act, where a proviso was added to extend the whole or any part of any section of this act to any of the hill areas of Manipur by executive order. Thus, it is a misleading notion that the land in the hills cannot be taken over (the added proviso was seldom used for development which would have improved the condition of life of local communities).

To further streamline the process of expropriating the hills-based tribal communities of their land, the state administration had in 2015 introduced a contentious bill to alter the MLR and LR Act to include all the hill areas. This sparked protests that resulted in the deaths of nine tribal protestors and a 632-day-long demonstration. Large tracts of land in the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar populated sections of the hill areas were declared as Reserved Forest (RF), Protected Forest (PF), Wildlife Sanctuary (WS), and Wetlands without consultation with the district councils and the Hill Areas Committee (HAC).

In August 2022, the state government had claimed that 38 villages that were settled in Churachandpur, a Kuki-majority district were “illegal immigrants” and “encroachers” on protected forest land. There is no valid basis that exists for this egregious claim by the government. In February 2023, acting upon its claim the government unilaterally proceeded to evict the Kuki residents from the so-called protected forest land.

The evictions of residents from the Kuki community were in violation of Article 371C, which confers some administrative autonomy to the tribal-dominated hill areas of Manipur. Moreover, these actions also violated the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, which stipulates the right of the tribal communities to make use of the forest land and resources for their livelihood.

These evictions, which fit in with the longer history of exclusion of tribal populations from decision-making processes, had a serious impact on the locals because they caused them to lose their means of livelihood. Additionally, the area has a history of being the target of land grabs, forcible evictions, and resource exploitation, which has resulted in poverty, social unrest, and a loss of cultural autonomy.

Further, the ST demand for the Meitei community upheld by the High Court was seen as yet another but a much more formidable attempt to deprive the Kukis of their land, resources, and livelihood by the dominant section of the Meitei community, which armed by the newfound ST status would oust them from their homeland.

Thus, the historical divide between the hills and the valley has become starker, and with the clashes, this divide and concomitant insecurity in the Kuki community has created more acceptance of demands ranging from separate administration to a separate Kuki state.

3. Valley and hill divide: historical context

The North-East region of India has diverse groups living in close proximity to each other, with a significant number of tribal groups residing in the hill areas. Many of these hill tribes lived in relative isolation, and the way of their economic life produced minimal social differentiation. The political organization of the tribal communities looked quite different from the modalities of the modern state. The modern state as a distinct organ of rule above the society and having absolute sovereignty became a problem for the indigenous notion of self-rule.

The relationship of the colonial state with the people of these areas was founded on the predominant motive of exploiting the resources. The British colonial government designated certain areas as non-regulated areas and codified them in the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874. From 1935 till the demise of the colonial order, these areas populated by various tribal groups were categorised into ‘excluded areas’ and ‘partially excluded areas’, with the former being governed directly, and the latter having a limited representative system. These areas were at the fringes of the British colonial empire and the predominant colonial view of these areas as problematic, unorderly and apart from the rest, continued to inform the actions of the post-colonial Indian state.

After the colonial rule ended, the then Indian lawmakers wanted to assimilate the North-East into a single domain to the rest of the country. As the Indian government tried to incorporate and assimilate the region into a single entity, the people resorted to political movements and agitations demanding greater political autonomy and statehood within the North-East. The Indian government tried to suppress these movements through multifarious suppressive means. Imposing of Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) is one such kind. Another means employed by the state to counter the opposition was to grant a type of self-government, the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in the hill areas. When India’s constitution was promulgated in 1950, six regions comprising the bulk of the North-East Indian landmass were designated ADCs. These councils have less power than states but more than local governments; they are intended to incorporate their predominantly tribal populations, as communities, into the Indian state. However, the issue of sovereignty has remained a problem, with the various tribes and tribal groups mounting stiff resistance to the nation-state which imposed its rule in the areas of the North-East without any regard for the local indigenous traditions of self-rule.

The incorporation of the hill areas into the modern state system has led to further ethnicisation of selfhood in the North-East. With the emergence of the modern state system many of the tribal communities came to believe that they were not properly represented in the modern state, thus rendering its legitimacy in crisis. The sense of being unrepresented and the ensuing problem of representation have led to the emergence of political aspirations of various ethnic groups to form separate states or have territorial integrity based on ethnicity.

However, despite the differences, the people residing in the North-East, Manipur in particular, are of the same ethnic stock. The various communities such as Kukis, Nagas, Meiteis, Mizos, and others are distant cousins who are part of the larger Indo-Tibetan-Burmese stock of people. It has been observed by various scholars that the North-East is a large collection of tribes of ‘mixed blood’ and it was almost impossible to isolate any one tribe in physical characteristics, language, religion, or customs. There has been intermixing amongst different groups – from erstwhile Burma to the Malay Peninsula, from the Mongolians and Tibetans in the north to the tribal groups of mainland India from the west and south, to make up the local tribes.

There have been waves of migration in the region. During the waves of migration, some groups settled in the valley and some groups remained in the hills and hence distanced from development and state formation. This so-called ethnic separation was compounded by the political and religious development in late medieval and early modern times. The coincidences of geographical terrain with a particular form of social formation have congealed historically to give a sense of differences among communities, which is presumed to be eternally present. The geographical location of these communities are merely happenstances not because of any inherent differences existing since primordial times, but due to the multiple ways in which various migratory waves in different phases interacted with the larger politico-economic processes. In a hypothetical manner, Meiteis could have inhabited the hills and Kukis could have lived in the valley; all the circumstances remaining the same, the situation would have been similar.

Centralized authorities such as kingdoms emerged in the valley due to the development of surplus-producing agricultural activities which could sustain non-productive classes. This was unlike the development in hills where a lack of economic surplus could not produce such polity. It is not that all tribal societies were acephalous (headless), but that leadership emerged only during certain settings. Outside these settings, there was no permanent ruling institution to rule over the rest of society. But, with time, the chiefs even among the comparatively more egalitarian tribal communities such as Kukis acquired more power. The paramount collective right over resources got occluded by the chief’s authority. The change in the balance of power within the Kuki community has made it imperative in present times for community organizations to increasingly articulate the collective interests of the community.

In a more sedentary society, the formation of identities is different than in other areas. Tribal communities were mostly kin-based (whether real or imagined) rather than territory-based. There was fuzziness about these identities in most historical periods. Historically, when communities or groups of people are separated or isolated from others, certain cultural traits tend to emerge which are loosely categorized as ethnicity. The more communities are in exchange with each other, the fewer cultural differences they have and vice-versa.

The emergence of a kingdom in the valley surrounding these tribal communities or later the advent of the colonial state led to territorialization of these erstwhile fuzzy identities. Earlier there existed cultural affinity between the various groups inhabiting the region, which can be observed in the pre-Vaishnavite religions and religious practices (Sanamahi and others). But, after the formation and consolidation of the kingdom in the valley and later, the arrival of Vaishnavism, the affinities got eclipsed by differences that became more pronounced.

The popular perception that there are permanent and persistent differences in ethnic traits between communities is misleading. These differences are not from time immemorial and have not remained the same in different historical periods. Differences and commonalities between groups and communities tend to reconfigure in different historical periods. People are part of historical processes and thus get incorporated into the larger structure of socio-politico-economic forces. The historical forces determine whether the differences among communities get perpetuated, accentuated, or assimilated. Despite the historical production of community differences, there are still cultural affinities that are common, the development of which indicates continuing social exchange. The ethnic identities are not fixed, but are historically created and are subject to historical changes. The popular Manipuri dish, Eromba, can serve as a useful example. Eromba comes from “eeru taana lonba”, a Meitei term for a liquid that is mixed. Considered a culinary delicacy, Eromba over the centuries has changed the way it is cooked. Earlier, Eromba was simply boiled and mashed vegetables with fermented fish. The ingredients now used in Eromba such as potatoes and chilli were brought to India by the colonial powers. In fact, our ancestors would have not recognized the dish the way it is now prepared. In a similar manner, cultural identities are subject to historical changes.

However, it does not mean that the after-effects of historical creation are fabricated. Though historically formed, tangible differences do exist among communities, but broader collective actions are shaped by how people of different communities face the larger real objective threats. Under British rule, many of these ethnicised communities fought against the colonial exploitative nexus of Sahukar (Usurer), Zamindar (Landlord), and Sarkar (Ruling regime). Historically, the majority of these ethnicised groups have existed at the periphery of more advanced social formations and have been surrounded by state formations such as kingdoms. Their struggles forced the post-colonial state to recognize their rights through special provisions in the Constitution and law, though ineffectively.

In our times, the primary foe of these communities is the dirty nexus between the state and corporate houses. In this context, one has to understand that many areas that are termed agriculturally backward and are populated by tribal communities have huge reserves of minerals and resources. Thus, corporate houses have an enormous interest in exploiting the resources in these areas. This is why these areas are now a target of the state-corporate nexus. The resource-rich land is being taken over, sometimes forcibly, for a pittance, without any regard for the lives and livelihood of tribal communities. This is the reason that local communities have fought for the protection of their livelihoods and habitats. Due to the struggles of tribal communities against oppression and exploitation, in the post-colonial period, they were granted special protection through a series of measures. To safeguard the rights of the tribal people, there are various provisions in the Constitution of India. The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution says that state governments must frame laws to “prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the Scheduled Tribes” in the Scheduled areas. The Sixth Schedule provides for administering tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram.

Manipur is governed by the Article 371C of the Indian Constitution. This provision mandates not just setting up Hill Areas Committee (HAC) with all elected tribal MLAs represented in them but also provides for modifications in the government’s rules of business to secure their proper functioning. Additionally, Article 371C(2) uses the term “shall”, which imposes a mandatory obligation on the state governor to send reports of the functioning of HACs to the President of India yearly or whenever necessary.

Furthermore, laws such as the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, have been enacted aimed at protecting the tribal communities and their livelihoods. However, various state and central governments have exploited loopholes that allowed land to be alienated from tribal populations, decreasing the corpus of tribal land and resulting in their forced migration.

Though such special provisions and laws are very limited and ineffective at times, these are necessary interim measures till the time a better system is in place. In Manipur too, therefore, the protected status of hills and forest areas should be seen as a justified measure.

Traditionally the valley areas populated by the Meitei community have been fertile and more developed than the surrounding hill areas. This can be witnessed by the development of a kingdom in the valley. They have had more contact with people from outside the state both in colonial and post-colonial times. The issue of granting them special protection such as that accorded to the hill-dwelling tribal communities is, therefore, a more complicated issue.

In this regard, one has to evaluate the Protection of Manipur Peoples Bill which was opposed by the hill tribes. The Protection of Manipur Peoples Bill was passed in 2018 after the Manipur government said they would not support the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019, unless they are shielded from outsiders in Manipur. While the Meitei community supported the Manipur People’s Bill, the tribal communities opposed it. The controversy over the Manipur People’s Bill was over two provisions: the recognition of ‘indigenous’ people and the cut-off date for recognition was pushed back from 1971 to 1951. In part, it is this recognition of the Meiteis as indigenous people that forms the basis of their demand to be recognised as a Scheduled Tribe, a demand strongly opposed by all tribal groups—both the Nagas and the Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups. The bill was passed in the Legislature with the majority representation from the Meitei community – 40 seats in the 60-seat Legislative Assembly (40 seats in the Manipur Legislature are unreserved, 1 is reserved for the SC community and 19 are reserved for the ST community).

The cut-off year set in 1951 is arbitrary and would render a majority of people belonging to the hill-dwelling tribal communities stateless as they do not possess documents of the time to prove that they are residents of the state. This is a problem that has been pointed out by historians in the context of war compensation after the Second World War. Various types of documents such as a patta, copies of land registrations, or any documents proving the ownership of a particular plot of land or property were mandatory for the people claiming compensation. The process of settling compensation was especially arduous for the hill-dwelling tribal communities as many did not possess any documents supporting their claims.

Moreover, the Mayangs or the outsiders residing in Manipur for long would have the same problem. During colonial times, Mayangs mostly came to Manipur as traders, teachers, and administrative staff. Most of them were from the erstwhile Bengal Presidency. These people serving the colonial regime were distrusted by the local population. However, over the course of time, the initial distrust due to the ties of outsiders with the colonial regime got detached from its particular colonial context and acquired merely cultural connotations. These cultural connotations of outsiders being associated with the colonial rule and therefore distrusted were later foisted onto the other outsiders especially the labouring poor who later came into the state. Many of these so-called outsiders are labouring poor who are contributing more to the economy of Manipur and getting very less in return. They are subjected to othering and discrimination. Instead of ironing out these issues demands such as protection of Manipur people through discriminatory laws will only breed xenophobic violence.

The majority of the tribal communities vehemently felt that the Protection of Manipur People Bill disregards the concerns of the hill population. This feeling is further aggravated by the steps taken by the Manipur government in recent years which are specifically aimed against the people residing in the hills. The different recommendations made by the constitutionally mandated Hill Areas Committee are simply ignored or outrightly rejected by the state government.

In 2015, the Manipur government tabled three bills that were directed against the autonomy of the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) disregarding the recommendations of the Manipur HAC for the tabling of a bill that would grant additional powers to ADCs in the hill districts. These three bills were introduced in an “emergency session” – the Protection of Manipur People Bill, 2015; the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Seventh Amendment) Bill, 2015, and the Manipur Shops and Establishments (Second Amendment) Bill, 2015 – and were hurriedly passed within two days. Protests emerged related to these enactments, which were brutally curbed by the state government and resulted in the death of nine people from the tribal communities and a protest that lasted for over 600 days. It was only after the intervention of the Central government that these three laws were recalled.

Again in 2021, the HAC pleaded for a special Assembly session to table the Manipur (Hill Areas) ADC Bill 2021, which sought to amend the 1971 District Councils Act. The state government ignored this request, laying the ground for an economic blockade imposed by the ATSUM.

The question arises as to why there is a persistent feeling among the tribal population that they are neglected. This can be answered by looking at the valley and hill divide in terms of infrastructure, educational and livelihood opportunities among others.

4. Valley and hill divide: present situation

Manipur is the third poorest state in India. There are differences in definitions and yardsticks to evaluate poverty which have yielded a conflicting picture on the issue of poverty. Still, as per the current yardstick used by the government, poverty in Manipur is around 36.89%. Low per capita income is one of the lowest in South Asia. Even those who live above the official poverty line, live a very fragile life. Many of them are at the verge of economic crisis if confronted by sudden medical expenditure, educational needs, etc. While Manipur is in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment there exist unequal distribution of wealth and development. There is a marked difference in the extent and nature of poverty between the valley and the hills. Infrastructure development in terms of power, transportation and communications has been low in majority of the hill areas. In majority of the hill areas, except certain enclaves, there is a higher proportion of people living in abject poverty in comparison to the valley. The transport bottleneck in the hills has made the basic necessity of life even costlier. Whatever has been the historical origin of the hill / valley divide it is important to understand its present conditions.

Land area, distribution and use in Manipur

The hills occupy almost 90% of the state area, but the valley, with just 10% land, is home to almost 60% of the people. Manipur has a population of 2,855,794 as per 2011 census. Of this total, 57.2% live in the valley districts and the remaining 42.8% in the hill districts. The valley (plain) is mainly inhabited by the Meitei speaking population. The hills are inhabited mainly by several ethno-linguistically diverse tribes belonging to the Nagas, the Kukis and smaller tribal groupings. The Meitei people represent around 53% of the population of Manipur state, followed by various Naga ethnic groups at 24% and various Kuki/Zomi tribes (also known as Chin-Kuki-Mizo people) at 16%.

Agriculture

Majority of the population in Manipur is engaged in agriculture. The present agricultural status in Manipur points towards the production of staple crops heavily concentrated in the fertile area of the valley. Since, most of the population in Manipur is dependent on agriculture and most of the agriculturalists are marginal producers (owning less than 1 hectare of land), it is erroneous to assume that the deprived sections in the Meiteis community would be able to purchase and make use of land in the hills, which presently they assume would happen once they get the ST status.

The current agricultural statistics are enough to dispel this view.

Agricultural production in Manipur (Valley/Hills)

Out of the total geographical area of the state, only 7.41 percent is used for cultivation. Of this total cultivated area, 52% is confined to the valley. Therefore, half of the total valley area, which accommodates 67% of the total population, is occupied for agriculture purposes. Rice cultivation dominates all others crops. Oilseeds and sugarcane are among the major cash crops.

Production of various staple and cash crops

Valley districts

2020-2021

Production in metric tonnes

District	Paddy (HYV and Pre-kharif)	Maize	Pulses	Wheat	Oilseeds	Sugarcane
Imphal East	136.00	3.20	3.50	0.67	3.76	39.43
Imphal West	127.88	3.18	3.50	0.70	3.28	28.77
Thoubal	118.75	4.75	4.24	1.10	4.60	87.27
Bishnupur	103.10	2.86	4.08	0.78	5.57	60.25

^*The government reports, surveys, etc, mostly use pre-2016 administrative districts as the basis for enumeration of data. The data presented in this study is presented accordingly.

Hill districts

2020-2021

Production in metric tonnes

District	Paddy (Jhum and Terrace)	Maize	Pulses	Wheat	Oilseeds	Sugarcane
Chandel	13.35	9.44	2.78	0.05	2.90	14.09
Churachandpur	38.00	13.90	2.65	1.14	2.89	12.35
Tamenglong	35.85	5.70	2.70	0.02	2.86	13.10
Senapati	16.18	10.20	2.62	1.34	2.95	13.25
Ukhrul	13.10	6.50	3.32	0.02	3.84	10.90

The tables (data sourced from Department of Agriculture, Manipur) above show that on an average the production of the staple crop is a more profitable venture in the valley than the hills. For example, the paddy production (in metric tonnes) is highest in Imphal East district i.e. 136 metric tonnes, while the most fertile district in terms of rice production in the hills is Churachandpur which produced 38 metric tonnes in 2020-21. The production of rice in the hills is, therefore, just about a quarter of what is produced in the valley.

The production of the important crops such as pulses and wheat, and cash crops such as oilseeds and sugarcane is more in the valley districts than in the hills. The only exception is maize production which is higher in the hills than the valley.

The production of fish, similarly, is way more in the valley districts than in the hills.

Districts-wise fish production in Manipur valley during 2003-04 to 2012-13

Districts-wise fish production in Manipur hills during 2003-04 to 2012-13

As per the data sourced from Department of Fisheries, Manipur, between 2003-04 and 2012-13, the production of fish in the valley districts was more than seven-fold of the production in the hill areas. 

It can be, therefore, safely argued that the per capita production of food is far greater in the valley areas than in the hill areas. Thus, the proportion of the population which the valley can support is far greater than the hills that have a far lower per-capita production of food.

The status of infrastructure in hills and valley in Manipur

For a long time, the burning question in Manipur, especially in the hill areas, has been the poor quality of administration and lack of basic facilities in the hills.

Some of North-East India’s most developed districts can be found in Manipur’s Valley region. Imphal West is the most developed district among the North-East states, according to the North East Region District Development Infrastructure Index 2009 (The Development Infrastructure Index was based on 7 indicators, including transportation, energy, irrigation, banking, banking infrastructure, educational institutions, and health facilities). Thoubal and Imphal East are placed sixth and eleventh, respectively, whereas Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Churachandpur, and Chandel are ranked 68, 75, 76, and 78 respectively. Three national highways and one international airport serve the valley, the most fertile area of Manipur, giving its population easy access to the outside world.

Likewise, the report of NITI Aayog 2021 titled ‘North Eastern Region District SDG Index Baseline Report 2021’ shows that the districts in the valley region are the most developed in terms of fulfilment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) which include poverty, hunger, health and well-being, education, decent work and economic growth among others as indices.

Educational infrastructure

Manipur has eight universities (Central Agricultural University, Dhanamanjuri University, Manipur University, Manipur University of Culture, Manipur Technical University, National Sports University, Sangai International University, Manipur International University), two Medical Institutes (Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Medical Sciences and Regional Institute of Medical Sciences), and three Technical Institutes (Manipur Institute of Technology, Indian Institute of Information Technology, National Institute of Technology). All these universities, medical institutes, and technical institutes are located in the valley alone. The only university in the hills is the Indira Gandhi National Tribal University, barely 22.8 kilometres from Imphal.

Public health facilities

Till very recently, the hill districts of Churachandpur, Chandel, Senapati, Tamenglong, Ukhrul, Kamjong, Noney, Kangpokpi and Pherzawl, combined, did not have even one government-owned multispecialty hospital.

Migration pattern in Manipur

As per the Census 2011 data, Manipur has the 2^nd highest (after Sikkim) inter-state and intra-state migration among all the states in the North-East. The main reasons for migration are lack of job opportunities, educational infrastructure and political unrest.

Moreover, as per the data, migration rate has been increasing in the North-East states in recent years as various migration studies have pointed out with a growing number migrating to the National Capital Region, Mumbai and Bangalore.

It should also be noted that historically people have migrated from less developed areas to more developed areas for better educational, employment and livelihood opportunities. Thus, the migration pattern in Manipur conforms to the historical trend. It is, therefore, unlikely that people from the more developed and fertile valley areas in Manipur would buy land and settle in the scarcely developed hill areas. Though arguments are being made that valley population would be enabled by the ST status to buy land and settle in the hills, in reality no significant migration from valley areas to hill areas is either foreseeable or likely.

Land crunch: the facts regarding population density in Manipur

Too much is made of land crunch in the valley area in Manipur, but the stark fact is that the population density of the state is among the lowest in the Indian subcontinent. Though having around 90% of the area of the state, the hills are mostly uninhabitable. Thus, the hills are sparsely populated.

However, despite such a sparse population on the hills even the plains in Manipur have a far lesser density of population than that in the other states in mainland India. In a 2011 list of the most populated 344 districts out of the total 766 districts in India, the only district of Manipur mentioned, that is Imphal, was positioned at 168 (998/km² as per 2011 census). A comparison can also be drawn with the other major cities across India such as those in the Ganga Valley, Narmada Valley, Krishna Valley, and Brahmaputra Valley, among others. Located in the Ganga Valley, the cities of Patna and Kanpur have a population density of 17,012/ km² and 6,900/km² respectively. The city of Jabalpur in Narmada Valley has a density of 3,390/ km². Guwahati on the Brahmaputra River has a density of 3,400/ km². Likewise, other major cities in India such as Kolkata, Hyderabad, and Bangalore have population densities of 24,760, 18,480, and 11,000 per square kilometer respectively. This is multifold times more compared to Imphal West, the most populous and densely populated district of Manipur.

Though much propaganda is being spread as to the purchase of land in the valley by the hill-dwelling tribal communities, the reality shows a very different picture. The population of STs in the valley is very less compared to their proportion to the population in the state. As per the 1901 Census, the population of the Kuki community was 14.5%. In the 2011 Census, the population of the Kuki community stands at 16.2%. This difference of just 1.7% corresponds to the growth in the population of many other groups across India. Moreover, the entire tribal population in valley districts is marginal. It stands at around 1800 in the entire Thoubal district, is not even 5% in Imphal West, is around 6% in Imphal East, and  1.3% in Bishnupur of the total population of these valley districts. The total population of the Meitei community is 53% as per 2011 census. There is no foreseeable trend in the increase in tribal population that can render the majority Meitei community into a minority in Manipur. Thus, the bogey of a huge increase in the tribal population, in particular that of the Kuki community, stands negated.

Therefore, the taking over of land in the valley by the tribal communities is a myth that fuels the demand for ST status among the Meitei community. But there is another phenomenon that is not much looked into.

Due to the lack of other viable resources and increasing pauperization in the Meitei community, land serves as the most important resource. There is a land hunger that fuels the demand for ST status with the attendant right to purchase land in the hills. In reality, in the valley, most of the land is being concentrated by the elites among the Meitei community. Intra-community transfer of land from the poor to the rich and elites is something being overlooked due to the vested interest of the elites in the Meitei community. In the past years, land belonging to the public or the socially deprived sections among Meiteis has been taken over and consolidated by the elites for building hotels, resorts, big private schools, and hospitals without them being accessible to a majority of labouring people in Manipur of all communities. A very important example is how the traditional fishing community huts were razed on Loktak Lake under the pretext of these huts being in the ecologically sensitive zone. But later the land was granted to the Classic Group in a prime location on the lake in Moirang to establish Sendra Park and Resorts. Needless to say, a majority of the Manipuris cannot afford to book the resort for special occasions like their honeymoon!

Moreover, people individually sell their land compelled by the exigencies of medical expenditure, educational finances, or the need to arrange money to diversify into business/non-agrarian work due to declining returns in agriculture. This sale of land within the Meitei community has led to the concentration and consolidation of land in the hands of the elites in the Meitei community. Due to the lack of alternative employment opportunities, the pressure on land is felt more by a large section of the Meitei community. Needless to say, in the valley districts, a large percentage of land is leased to cultivators while owners live elsewhere. Such leased land cropping is far more than the national average.

5. The question of Scheduled Tribes (ST) status for Meitei community

The concerns of the Kuki community

The tribal groups especially the Kuki community fear that granting ST status to Meiteis would lead to loss of job opportunities and allow them to acquire land in the hills, pushing the tribal people out of their traditional homelands. The way the hill communities have historically been treated by the Manipur government has pushed these communities to see the demand for ST status as a ploy to counterfoil the political demands of the Kukis and Nagas with a tacit strategy of the majority community’s elites to make inroads into the hill areas.

The state of Manipur already lags behind in development. There is a significant lack of educational and employment opportunities in the entire North-East region, especially in Manipur. Thus, the scant educational opportunities for the people in general and hill communities, in particular, are seen to be getting diluted if the demand for ST status is accepted. The tribal communities argue that granting ST status to the Meitei community could dilute the benefits and opportunities currently available to the tribal groups. They fear that limited resources and reservations could be further divided, affecting their representation and access to government schemes.

There are also concerns that the inclusion of the Meitei community as STs might lead to disputes over land and resources, as the tribal communities have customary rights and control over certain territories.

The concerns of the Meitei community

While the Kuki community sees itself as beleaguered, the poor among the Meitei community have also been feeling so for some time now. For at least a decade the ‘Scheduled Tribe Demand Committee,’ has been fighting for the ST status for Meiteis.

The Meitei activists claim that before the merger of the Manipur princely state with the Union of India on 15 October 1949, the community had been listed as a tribe by the colonial government. Their contention is that the ST status is needed to “preserve” the Meitei community and “save the ancestral land, tradition, culture, and language.”

However, more important than culture, language and traditions is the issue of land. It has been claimed by the Meitei intellectuals that Imphal Valley is shrinking. While people from the hills such as Nagas and Kukis can buy land in Imphal, they cannot do so. These arguments are sought to be buttressed by claims such as Imphal Valley only occupies about 10% of Manipur’s total geographic area and is populated by around 60% of the population, while the hills having 90% of the land are populated by only 40% of the total population in Manipur. They further claim that the ST status for Meiteis will lift the restriction on buying and selling land, which will lead to more integration between the valley and the hills.

Though such an assertion is made by the Meitei intellectuals, it is a grossly erroneous assessment of the economic and geographical conditions of Manipur. The assessment we made above of the low-levels of agrarian productivity in the hills area dispels the notion that land buying in the hills is a rational and sustainable option for the majority of Meitei agriculturalists.

6. Status of reservation and the claims being spread in the majority Meitei community

In Manipur, at present, the status of reservation in public-sector jobs and educational institutions stands as follows: 2% for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Caste (SC), 31% for the Scheduled Tribes (ST), and 17% for the Other Backward Classes (OBC).

Though there is much clamour for the ST status among the Meitei community, there is no proper assessment of what this demand entails. Any community to be included in the STs must fulfill the five criteria which have been mandated by the 1965 Lokur Committee. These criteria include indications of primitive traits, distinctive culture, geographical isolation, shyness of contact with the community at large, and backwardness.

Moreover, the process for the inclusion of any community in the ST list is cumbersome. The Supreme Court had recently expressed its displeasure over the way the Manipur High Court pronounced judgement in the case. Clearly, the case for ST inclusion is politically motivated.

The Meitei demand for ST status is not legally viable. Recently, this issue became so controversial and volatile that the Office of the Registrar-General of India (RGI) has declined to make public its position on whether the Meitei (Meetei) community in Manipur can be categorised as a Scheduled Tribe as per the criteria currently in use. The office of the RGI said that disclosing this information to the public would ‘prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the state, relation with foreign state or lead to incitement of an offence’.

The demand for inclusion of the Meitei community into the ST List is politically motivated, and not legally viable. However, different models are being circulated in the public domain as to what could be the case if Meiteis are granted ST status. We will examine below whether it will hypothetically benefit the common people amongst Meiteis, and the impact it will have on other communities.

Meiteis are not a socially homogenous group and are divided into different castes. In the early post-colonial period, dominant sections among the Meiteis denied being considered as a tribal community. After adopting Vaishnavism, they considered themselves as caste-Hindus and looked down upon and discriminated against the followers of the older faith, Sanamahi, and those considered untouchable. For both these communities, the term used was Mangba (unclean). Likewise, Meiteis considered themselves apart from the tribal communities and used the derogatory term Hao for them. Thus, they were not classified under the category of ST, but some among the Meiteis, such as those considered untouchable and the followers of the older Sanamahi faith, were categorised as SCs.

After the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, different sections of the Meitei community were included in the Other Backward Classes (OBC) category. Meitei Brahmins (Bamons) and Meitei Rajkumars who are among the dominant sections in the Meitei community are also included in the Central OBC List. However, they can only avail of reservation if they are non-creamy layer OBCs. As per the current scheme of reservation, the Meitei community has access to General, OBC, and SC seats in government institutions and jobs. The political narrative built by the elites of the majority community has propelled the notion that ST status would boost their chances not just of acquiring land in the hills, but also of educational opportunities in the state and mainland India. Let us scrutinize this claim.

At present, the Meitei SCs who comprise 3.78% of the total population in the state are accorded 2% reservation in state-level jobs and seats in educational institutions. The inclusion of the Meitei SC community into the ST list would entail that the 2% reservation which they alone enjoy would get diluted with the reservation granted to all the STs as well as the dominant caste Meiteis. Thus, they stand to lose in percentage terms their chances if included in the ST list. The benefits of ST reservation will be enjoyed by the dominant caste Meiteis as the current STs and SCs will not be able to compete with them.

The majority of the Meiteis are included in the OBC List and are accorded 17% reservation in state-level jobs and seats in educational institutions. However, the creamy-layer section of the OBCs which includes a substantial number in the Meitei Brahmin and Rajkumar communities is not entitled to reserved positions and seats. However, with their inclusion into the ST list, they would get reservation in the ST category. Thus, the creamy layer section of the OBCs forming the upper segment of the OBC population would also get reservation under the ST category. This case scenario amounts to a loss for the non-creamy layer lower segment in the OBCs. Overall, it will be a gain for the upper segment of OBCs which would benefit at the cost of the non-creamy layer lower segment of the OBCs and the STs.

Currently, the dominant sections in the Meitei community have dominated in the field of sports, politics, business, government jobs, and military, which underlines their evolution as an influential political elite as well as a dominant economic class. Their inclusion in STs would only consolidate their power in society at the cost of subordinates in all communities.

The status of reservation, as it stands, applies to public educational institutions and government service and public-sector jobs. The overall all-India trend is a secular decline in the number of seats in educational institutions (in proportion to the growing number of applicants) and government jobs. The situation is particularly alarming in the North-East states which have a significant lack of educational and job opportunities. This has resulted in a steady out-migration from the North-East states. Thus, the reservation would not bring any worthwhile tangible benefit to the majority in the Meitei community.

The other argument put forward regarding the acquisition of land in the hills is also a pipe-dream fed to the common Meitei people. As already shown above, there is a stark difference in the hill and valley areas in Manipur in terms of land productivity and use. The valley is much more fertile and consequently has a larger population. Thus, in real terms, it is almost unlikely that the land in the hills would be of much use to the majority in the Meitei community who are predominantly dependent on agriculture and allied activities.

There is a market for land in the valley areas. For want of other financial resources, the land is the primary resource for a majority. The land can be bought, sold, and mortgaged. The land market in the valley area serves the need of individual buyers and sellers. Thus, the individual sellers do not have a problem in selling off their land to buyers in the valley areas as it serves various purposes for which ready money is needed. However, what is resented by the people is the wholesale acquisition of land. Only the corporates and capitalists are in a position to acquire wholesale land. But, they are generally more interested in the hitherto unavailable resource-rich forest land in the hills and not in land in the valley. Thus an acute threat looms large over the traditional tribal lands in which the corporates are interested.

The whole endeavour of the ruling elites is to design and manipulate the political processes to expedite the rise of a few elites while looting the land and livelihood of common people by exploiting the differences among communities through divisive politics. This is now in full view in Manipur with the hatred in the majority community being directed towards the tribal communities and intensively being fueled by RSS-backed Hindu supremist brand of social engineering. 

7. The false claims and arguments being made for evictions and vilification of Kuki community

The immigrants from Myanmar fleeing state-sponsored violence

​The North-East region shares a contiguous area with neighbouring hill-tracts of Bangladesh and Myanmar. Historically, there had been movements of people across this entire area. But, with the arbitrary imposition of borders, this contiguous area was fractured, thereby dividing populations across the state and international borders. So, it is the coming of the border which divided the same linguistic and cultural groups that have entrenched socio-economic linkages. Moreover, Manipur has a porous international boundary with Myanmar with an active cross-border trade and movement of people. In recent years there has been some immigration of people from the Chin community in neighbouring Myanmar, especially after the coup by the Military Junta. The Chin people are among the poorest in the Myanmarese population and there is ethnic homogeneity and concomitant affinity between the people on both sides of the India-Myanmar border. The Chin community shares a linguistic and cultural affinity with the Kuki and Mizo communities residing in the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram. Moreover, even the Meiteis living in Kabaw Valley of Myanmar and Mandalay share an affinity with the Meiteis living in Manipur. They are also one of the communities that have suffered political persecution and social discrimination in Myanmar.

What is alarming is the total refusal of the Indian government to recognize the Chin people as refugees fleeing state-sponsored violence in Myanmar. In this context, it should be noted that India is neither a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor does it have domestic legislation focusing on refugee rights. Instead, it governs refugees according to domestic laws meant for foreigners who voluntarily enter India, thereby conflating two different categories of people coming to India.

This legislative gap means refugees in India can face arbitrary treatment ranging from legal protection to summary imprisonment and even deportation, largely determined by political whims and various calculations by different governments. This is precisely what has happened in the case of Chin people who have been outrightly declared “illegal immigrants” in India. The Kuki community which shares affinities with the Chin people has also been vilified.

This portrayal of an entire community as “illegal immigrants” is aligned with the political exigencies. While in Manipur the Chin people are demonized and vilified, in the neighbouring state of Mizoram, the state government has been more accommodating towards the Chin people despite the dictates of the Central government.

Although there is huge apprehension regarding Chin immigrants in Manipur, in real terms there has not been an astounding influx despite the coup in Myanmar. Among the measures implemented by the state government to crack down on illegal migration in the hill districts sharing a border with Myanmar, are biometric surveillance, house-to-house Aadhaar verification, and periodic launch of a ‘special drive for identification of illegal migrants’ in the hill districts. In addition, 34 police outposts are being set up between Jesami and Behiang in the border area with the approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Despite such intensifying surveillance, unverified media estimates suggest that about 5000 Myanmarese may have entered Manipur since February 2021, but these are not backed by any concrete evidence. Chief Minister Biren Singh reported that 393 people from Myanmar had been detained in the state from 2012 to February 2023. One of them was deported, 107 are being held in prison, 105 are being held in detention facilities, and 180 have been granted bail. 210 of them were captured between February 2022 and 2023.  

A total number of 114 immigrants have been detained this year: 81 in January in the district of Tengnoupal, and 10 and 23 in February and April 2023, respectively, in the Churachandpur district. Temporary shelters and detention centres for the migrants have come up in Churachandpur, Tengnoupal, and Chandel districts. Thus, the alleged migration is actually minuscule and a majority of the immigrants are fleeing from the civil war raging in Myanmar. Though migration is certainly there, it is not an enormous problem which cannot be successfully tackled in an empathetic and humanitarian manner.

In fact, due to base political motives immigrants and the Kuki community are being vilified. The issue of immigrants is not beyond solution. The political will is not just missing, but actually the state and central governments are playing mischievous roles in this regard. Despite the fact that there has been some immigration in recent years due to civil war in Myanmar, the Central government through the Ministry of Home Affairs says it will not recognise the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identity card issued to refugees, and it would not issue exit permits even to those who get resettlement in third countries. This is being done despite the fact that the representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs are on the executive committee of the UNHCR. Moreover, there is no Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) operating in Manipur. Because of the lack of a proper system in place, many of the refugees are rendered illegal immigrants. The refugees arriving in India due to persecution are forced to reach cities in mainland India for registration. This is a tedious task for the refugees who are fleeing political violence in Myanmar, and have to also suffer social ostracization and political victimisation in India.

It seems that solving the issue of immigrants is not at all the real concern of the political establishment. The issue is merely being used to further divisive politics and as a plank to dominate the resource-rich hill forests. 

Poppy cultivation

In recent times, the political elite has tried to vilify the Kuki community as “poppy cultivators”. This vilification has seeped through the popular sentiment in the majority community. Due to an already existing distrust of the hill communities, the crackdown on the Kuki community has been justified as a crackdown on poppy cultivation.

However, what is suppressed in the popular domain, but is a crucial fact that not just the hill communities, but vested interests and elites in the valley areas and belonging to the majority Meitei community are also involved in the cultivation of poppies in the hills. The data on arrests of persons under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act of 1985 portrays a starkly different picture than that asserted by the government. According to the state’s special anti-drugs unit Narcotics and Affairs of Border (NAB), of the 2518 people arrested in the past five years, 381 were Meiteis, 1,083 Muslims, 873 Kuki-Chin, and 181 others. The number of arrests was highest in 2022 at 658. Till mid-May 2023, 80 people have been arrested under the NDPS Act. Kukis are neither the only community to indulge in the cultivation of poppy and drug trade, nor are they among the largest group in the overall arrests made. More importantly, the data doesn’t seem to indicate the arrest of any Myanmar citizen for involvement in poppy cultivation and drug trade.  

The area under poppy cultivation in Manipur keeps rising and falling. According to NAB, 15,497 acres of land have been found under poppy cultivation in the last five years. Of these, 13,122 acres were in Kuki-Chin controlled areas, 2,340 acres in Naga controlled areas, and 35 acres in other areas. Further, NAB data shows that poppy cultivation in Kuki-Chin controlled areas increased by 30 percent from 2,001 acres in 2017-18 to 2,600 acres in 2021-22, but declined to 804 acres in 2022-23. However, the poppy cultivation areas under the Naga tribes increased from 305 acres to 350 acres. While this shows the overwhelming involvement of the Kukis in poppy cultivation in the state, there is almost no evidence to support the claim of the involvement of Myanmar nationals.

It is an undeniable fact that Manipur does have a drug problem. There is ample information about poppy cultivation in the hills. However, the roots are mostly in the Golden Triangle region and not so much in Manipur. In 2022, 40,000 hectares (about 98,842 acres) of poppy were cultivated in Myanmar, compared to 1,154 acres for the entire Manipur in 2022–2023. So, poppy cultivation in Manipur is not an insurmountable problem.

In the last years, there has been a crackdown on poppy cultivation. But, the question is why there is poppy cultivation in the hills. Deprived of livelihood opportunities, some have turned to poppy cultivation as it is easier than traditional agriculture and fetches high profits. While the farmers get a paltry amount of profit, it is the nexus of politicians, poppy traders, and security personnel which keeps poppy cultivation going and trade flourishing.

To stop this menace, a concerted effort has to be made. The example of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2020 shows that forcible steps hardly achieve the desired result. Unless the farmers are sensitized and alternate livelihood programmes are started, poppy would always remain an attractive cash crop for impoverished farmers. Unfortunately, the state government has for ulterior aims demonized the Kuki tribes and the ‘Myanmar migrants’. Instead, the Kukis can play a key part in not only eradicating poppy cultivation in Manipur but also stopping the smuggling of drugs into Manipur from Myanmar.

Jhum cultivation

There is also resentment amongst the Meitei community regarding the restricted implementation of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act (MLR and LR Act), which prohibits the state government to formulate policies for the hill areas concerning land and revenue. However, due to vociferous demand from the elite of the majority community, several attempts have been made to make amendments to the act. Thus, in 2015 the Sixth Amendment was sought to be made to the Act by inserting a new section 13 (B) which states: Power to regulate and control ‘jhum’ or migratory cultivation. By targeting the Jhum or shifting cultivation which is the primary method of agriculture in the hills, the state government seeks to abrogate the traditional customs and rules of the hill communities. By the amendment, the state government can make rules for regulating and controlling jhum or migratory cultivation for the protection of the environment, catchments areas of irrigation, hydro-electric and water supply projects, and prevention of landslides near National and State Highways and major district roads. This amendment shows attempts by the state government to control the hills by putting forward the dubious claim of Jhum cultivation being ecologically destructive. In reality, the government is actually preparing grounds for the arrival of agro-based companies such as those interested in palm oil and other monoculture crops by pushing for developmental aggression of vested economic interests in the traditional Jhum cultivation lands.

In this regard, it is important to note that amendment has also been sought to the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 (FCA). The Forest Conservation (Amendment) Bill, 2023 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on March 29 to amend the FCA. The Bill reportedly creates the scope for large-scale conversion of forest land into non-forestry use while providing easy access to corporate houses. While the economic activities of the local population are sought to be curtailed, the Bill gives blanket exemptions to the existing stringent provisions of the FCA. For instance, land situated within 100 km along the international borders, the Line of Control, or the Line of Actual Control is proposed to be used for the “construction of strategic linear projects of national importance and concerning national security”. This means a significant diversion of forest lands in the untouched areas of the Eastern Himalayas, which are rich in biodiversity and natural resources. The North-East states share borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Tibet, and China. The Bill is likely to affect nearly 90 percent of Nagaland’s territory, which lies within 100 kilometers of the international border, much of Arunachal and Assam; and the entire region of Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, and Tripura.

8. Corporate interests in timber, minerals, and other resources of the hills area

Capitalists and corporates seek to exploit the abundant natural resources of the forests in the hills. Their role in precipitating the present crisis has been almost totally ignored.

There is significant timber trade in Manipur. Almost the total trade is dominated by the non-tribal people. As per the licenses granted to the contractors by the Forest Department for timber trade, most are from the Meitei community. There is also a significant amount of illegal trade in timber in which not just businessmen, but Forest Department officials, police, and security establishment are involved. However, the corporates are also now eyeing this trade that has much potential for generating revenue. Thus, there is not just a vested interest in having a flourishing timber trade, but to have legal access to the abundant forests in the hills for the purpose. Stone and sand mining are also important revenue-generating activities based on forests that have been promoted in recent years by the state government, sometimes against the orders of the High Court which had prevented illegal mining of these resources.

Similarly, Manipur has plenty of minerals that are sought to be exploited by capitalists and corporates. Most of the mineral deposits are located in the hills. Deposits of limestone, chromite, evaporities, mineral water, ferrous alloy metals, asbestos, semi-precious metals, clay, and fossil fuels occur in significant amounts in the hills.

Palm oil cultivation is being promoted in the entire North-East region including Manipur. The National Mission on Edible Oils-Oil Palm aims to bring a total of 6.5 lakh hectares of land under palm cultivation; of this 3.28 lakh hectares will be in the North-East states and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Already, several North-East states have signed MOUs with corporate groups such as Patanjali and Godrej Agrovet and are converting agricultural and forest lands into monoculture, cash-crop plantations.

Manipur also has deposits of around 5000 billion cubic feet of oil. The Government of India through the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas had granted licenses to companies such as Jubiliant Oil and Gas Private Limited (JOGPL), a Netherlands-based oil exploration company, for exploring and drilling two oil blocks in Manipur located in the Jiribam, Tamenglong, and Churachandpur districts of Manipur, without the consent of locals. This license was later withdrawn due to stiff resistance from the people. The contracts were awarded under the eighth round of the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) of the Government of India. Earlier too without any intimation to the locals, the government had undertaken a series of promotions globally in 2003 and 2009 to promote the oil blocks of ‘the jeweled land’, along with others through road-shows in major cities of the world like London, Houston, Calgary, and Perth, etc, inviting bids to oil companies.

In India, the Union government enjoys exclusive rights to legislate in all matters pertaining to oil and natural gas, including the development of oil fields and mineral oil resources. This has been misused by successive governments to completely disregard the concerns of the local populations which have resisted oil exploration and drilling in various areas. Now the Union government has come out with the new Open Acreage Licensing Policy (OALP), 2017 that gives the corporate houses scope for more unregulated exploitation of resources.

There are various global and Asian institutions that are investing in the North-East states and in Manipur. Such institutions include the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) which are investing in electricity generation projects in Manipur such as the building of dams without proper cost and impact assessment.

One of the key struggles faced by the people of Manipur is the construction of big dams under the Manipur Hydro Power Policy. The construction of mega dams has resulted in the displacement of entire communities, and the destruction of agricultural land, forests, and the rich biodiversity of the region. Manipur which already produces surplus power faces load-shedding and long outages. Many areas in the hills still do not have an electricity supply. Thus, the question emerges as to who are the beneficiaries of these power-generation projects. The WB facilitates loans for high-voltage transmission and distribution lines, connecting Manipur with other parts of India and also with South-East Asian countries. Transmission lines are an important infrastructure to transmit power. So, their construction legitimizes the building of dams. The ADB is supporting power sector privatization in the region. Japanese banks are funding dams. So corporate houses are targeting the land in Manipur for their profit and are supported by the government and these financial institutions. There has been a marked shift in the very logic of the so-called development projects. In earlier times, these projects were started with the stated aim of being for public purpose and many of the projects were undertaken by the public-sector companies. Now, however, the majority of these projects are being undertaken by private interests under the aegis of global finance capital. This drive for aggressive development of energy production will only bring profits for the corporate houses and provide benefits to far-flung areas. But, for the affected communities, it will only serve to further pauperize and marginalize them.

Despite the hills area being rich in mineral deposits and resources, it is the resistance of the people which has prevented their exploitation by the corporate houses. To exploit these natural resources rather than any concern for the inclusive development of the region, the government along with the corporate houses and international financial institutions is bent on devising policies to enable the plundering of the forest land. The real task is, therefore, to see through the current measures of the government that are aimed at demonizing a particular community, which in turn serves as a tool for sowing animosity among the labouring people of the state, thereby evacuating possibilities of their unity against the envisaged corporate plunder. 

9. The way forward: rearticulating demands ​

In recent years we have seen a growing trend among the state governments of persecuting minority communities to strengthen their constituencies among the majority communities in the North-East states. In Assam, there has been continuous mobilization of the Ahom community against people from different states of India. Moreover, the Muslim community residing in the state has been vilified and termed ‘outsider’, while there has been increasing marginalisation of people from other communities. Recently, this ostracization and discrimination had led to clashes between communities across the Assam-Mizoram border. The communities residing in or near forests have also been evicted in Assam such as in February 2023 in the district of Sonitpur and in 2022 the Bengal Muslim community residing in Nagaon district.

Similarly, in Arunachal Pradesh, the state government has denied residency permits to people belonging to Chakma and Hajong communities. The Chakma and Hajong communities who live in Arunachal Pradesh are among the poorest of the poor communities in the country. However, despite being residents of India for decades, they continue to face various kinds of oppression and deprivation. The communities are at various points made scapegoats by the respective governments for their self-seeking narrow political aims. Instead of granting citizenship rights to the communities as per rules and procedure, shamefully denying them even Resident Proof Certificates (RPCs), creates legal precarity for the vulnerable Chakma and Hajong communities.

In 2021 communal violence rocked the North-Eastern state of Tripura, with the elements close to the ruling BJP government responsible for arson and violence on the Muslim minority community. The violence was incited in retaliation against the alleged violence on the minority Hindu community in neighbouring Bangladesh. Clearly, such instances point to the conspicuous role of the BJP government in actively promoting communalism in order to reap political dividends.

These trends across the entire North-East show that inter-community hatred is being sown and perpetuated for political benefits to the ruling political parties. These aggressive policies of the governments are aimed at a larger agenda of sowing discord among the communities in the North-East through divisive politics and thereby garnering support in the majority communities across the region. This is being done to create political space for the RSS-BJP brand of communal, anti-minority politics for a long time, and to thereby enable the plunder of resources by the corporate houses.

At present, the government of Manipur has lost the trust of all communities. There is rising anger against the government not just in the Kuki community, but among the other communities as well. The MLAs belonging to both Kuki and Meitei communities have been attacked in the last month. Public anger has forced the BJP MLAs belonging to the Kuki community to go against the party line and demand a separate Kuki state. There is a counter-demand of the Meitei community for upholding the territorial integrity of Manipur. There is a stark contrast between territorial integration and the integration of the people. Merely talking of territorial integrity without the integration of people tends to expunge the people from any positive imagination in majoritarian politics. In the process, territorial integrity is given more value than the people inhabiting it. This can be understood with the allegorical example of the difference between a house and a home. House simply means a structure where people live, while home has an entirely different connotation of being a place where people not just live but share bonds with each other. Thus, territorial integration without the integration of people ultimately achieves the unity of a certain landmass with festering divisions among the people.

Though at the present moment, the demand for a separate state might seem a genuine demand of the bruised Kuki community, the pitfalls of such a demand are not being looked into. Demand for statehood on ethnic grounds is complex as it would render the other communities in the new state as minorities, thus fueling more inter-community tensions. Likewise, from being a minority in the undivided state, a section of the Kuki community which may continue to reside in the former state would become an absolute minority; thereby weakening the movement for equal rights for all communities. Thus, devolution of power should be the aim of the communities instead of separate states as that would ensure better forms of self-rule for all.

There are at present six Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in Manipur. The constitution of four additional ADCs in the newly created hill districts is still pending, and elections to all ADCs have not been conducted for a long time. Importantly, while ADCs in other North-East states have been formed under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India, a separate law, i.e., the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, was enacted for the formation of ADCs in Manipur. No area of Manipur currently falls under the Sixth Schedule. There is a crucial difference in the functioning of ADCs in Manipur and in the Sixth Schedule areas. While in the Sixth Schedule areas the ADCs have more power, the ADCs in Manipur have less power and over the years their functioning has been hindered by the bypassing of their decisions. In the Sixth Schedule areas, the Governor directly holds power over the ADCs, while in Manipur, a Deputy Commissioner serves as a link between the ADCs and the Governor. The ADCs in the Sixth Schedule areas have also been granted additional powers, such as in the case of the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council and the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council, to make laws regarding industries, communication, agriculture, fisheries, primary and secondary education, and alienation of land among others. But, the ADCs in Manipur can only control and administer the subjects granted to them. These subjects are mostly minor subjects. Hence, the demand for the Sixth Schedule in Manipur.

While the interim demand for more power to ADCs in Manipur is important, the aim of all communities both in the hills and valley should be to go beyond the so-called representative models of democracy which are of western import, and to adopt newer models of self-rule where people have more participation in decision-making and in shaping what impacts their lives. The current form of representative democracy is such that in every constituency the person who gains the first position is deemed as the legitimate representative (as per the first-past-the-post principle) and rules over people who have cast their vote for others. In this system the other representatives, who despite garnering sizeable number of votes, are reduced to powerlessness, and the people who voted for them are rendered defeated people. Within this power equation, it is not just minority communities whose voices are curtailed, but even people on the ‘winning’ side come to be easily betrayed by the decisions taken purportedly in their interest by the so-called legitimate representatives. So, more advanced local councils where people can actively participate in the making of decisions should be sought as future substitutes for the existing political system. In this regard, the ADCs in the hills should not be perceived with animosity by the majority community. Instead, they should – with of course necessary modifications to facilitate greater decision-making by common people – be seen as a model for replication of self-rule in the valley as well.

Here it is important to recall the historical trajectory by which post-British state formation emerged in erstwhile colonized parts of the world. In the case of India, it is hard to overlook the substantial sidelining of the people’s aspirations from the moment of integration of princely states to the actual process of Constitution framing. As per the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Constituent Assembly, tasked with the framing of the Indian Constitution, was created on the basis of a property franchise rather than a universal adult franchise. In this way, it did not embody and represent the will of the people. It is not a coincidence then that many of the crucial aspirations and claims of the common masses were relegated to the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution; making them non-justiciable matters, and thereby dependent for implementation on the will of the state. Further, the history of integration of princely states like Manipur reveals that the merger agreements and modalities were negotiated by the newly created Dominion State of India with the kings, and not with chosen representatives of the struggling populations in these regions. The merger agreements were consequently resisted from their very inception, as in the case of Manipur wherein the elected Assembly on 28^th September 1949 passed a resolution against the merger. Different tribal communities also continued to question this merger as they did not consider the Manipuri king as their representative. The legendary Manipuri leader, Hijam Irabot, continued to struggle in his last days against both monarchy and the agreement between the king and Dominion of India.

The subsequent economic policies and political processes of the Indian state gradually stunted the economy of Manipur; reducing it to the status of a dependent economy, and creating a vicious circle of underdevelopment as well as plummeting the region to a hotbed of insurgency. The underdevelopment and resultant threat to life and livelihoods have fueled struggles which have increasingly become ethnicised as power-brokering between elites of all local communities and the state-corporate combine have nurtured community chauvinism and divisive politics.       

In the din which has followed the recent clashes, one of the main issues at hand has been forgotten; the issue of eviction. In the last months, we have witnessed the razing of homes of people from the Kuki community and their eviction from their homes. This has been done ostensibly for curbing poppy cultivation as well as in the name of saving the reserved and protected forests. However, it is a disgraceful act meant to target the hill community which already has very limited resources for livelihood. If the intention was to curb poppy cultivation, it could have been done without evicting the communities. Measures taken worldwide for curbing poppy cultivation must be taken, including creating alternate livelihood programmes for the community and taking the community into confidence about such measures. However, this can only be done if the aim really is to curb poppy cultivation. But, in the present case, larger motives are operating behind the actions of the government.

Secondly, if the motive is to preserve the forests, it has to be done in concurrence with the provisions of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. As per the provisions of the Act, the communities residing in and near forests are allowed the use of land and resources of forests, and they cannot be evicted. In this context, it should be noted that the Kukis have a clear history of them living freely in their ancestral lands. That they fought the British in the Anglo-Kuki war 1917-1919 in defence of their ancestral land and freedom is well documented and acknowledged worldwide. To disregard their interests and proclaim their ancestral lands as reserved forests without any consideration and consultations whatsoever is highly authoritarian and anti-people, to say the least.

In fact, evictions have been going on for a time now in Manipur without any regard for the law or the plight of the affected communities. In the last few years, we have seen evictions aimed not just against the Kuki community, but at people belonging to the Meitei community as well. The fishing community residing near Loktak Lake was forcibly evicted to ‘boost’ tourism. In November 2011, the State, represented by the Loktak Development Authority (LDA), started to evict Loktak fishers from the lake area citing the fishers as illegally occupying shelter huts built on floating biomass for their fishing activity. Around 777 shelter huts were pulled down and burnt by the government. Personal belongings – fishing nets, tools, fish traps, clothes, mattresses, utensils, and children’s books – were also destroyed.

In a similar move in July 2022, the LDA issued a new notification stating that all Athaphum, which is a practice of fishery in the form of circular open-water fish culture ponds formed with floating biomass, must be removed within a period of 15 days from the date of notification. The fishing community resisted this move and termed it a renewed attempt by the state government to completely restrict them from the lake.

Likewise, people from all communities have been evicted from forest areas citing the reason that they were encroaching upon the forest land. Between January 2017 and April 2023, 291 families have been removed from protected and reserve forest land. Of these, 160 belong to the Meitei community. The other communities evicted include Kuki, Meitei Pangals, Kabui (Naga), and Nepalis.

Thus, it is high time that the communities see and recognize the real danger, the evictions of labouring people of all communities by the government serving the vested interests of local elites, corporate houses and international financial institutions. The evictions of all communities must be stopped and all communities must unite in forcing the government to keep its hands off people’s livelihoods and homes.

Likewise, the demand for ST status for Meiteis must be analysed in the correct manner. The government wishes to drum up support for its anti-Kuki policies by aligning the majority community and baiting it with the demand for ST status. In real terms, this is legally unsustainable. Moreover, the demand would mean not just a loss for the STs, but would adversely affect the non-creamy layer lower segment OBCs within the Meitei community as their reservation quota would get diluted. This combined with the current lack of government and public-sector jobs and educational opportunities means that no perceptible gain would accrue to the majority in the Meitei community.  Thus, the youth of the majority community are being fooled by the political elite for a demand which is legally unviable and would in real terms not bring any tangible benefits for them even if somehow the modalities of such reservation fall into place.

Thus, the issue is not just about saving the ethnic identities of Meitei or Kuki communities, but also about resisting the dastardly covert aims of the state and central governments. In the present context, the unity of the people is sought to be destroyed so as to preclude any resistance against the imminent plunder of people’s resources and destruction of their livelihoods. Moreover, many of the policies being implemented in India have linkages with global corporate and finance interests so there has to be a concerted and united effort to resist such policies in solidarity with people across India.

During the present conflict in Manipur, what is especially lamentable is the absence of effective left-wing politics that alone could have fostered common platforms and class organizations of the labouring people across different communities. The people of Manipur are at crossroads. At this juncture, different communities have to decide whether to get victimized separately in different moments of time or to ensure the unity of all the toiling masses so as to mount resistance against divisive politics and corporate loot. For this historical task, we need to give up our respective ethnic lens and use objective interests as the criteria to analyse the present moment. Only this could become the basis for the future coming together of the oppressed and exploited segments within all communities, who would be more amenable to seeking common interests beyond ethnic divides.

Objective interests should be the predominant criteria to evaluate the contemporary conjuncture that we find ourselves in because what else can ensure that we are not projecting our subjective biases on facts and circumstances. We are all born in one or the other community due to which we are inculcated with certain subjective biases. We need the yardstick of objective interests to overcome these biases that prevent us from seeing the common interests of the toiling people of all communities. Moreover, objective interests prepare the grounds for unity among the people while ethnic identities create an abyss and divide. The presence of the Left organizations and ideology could have given an all-encompassing and concrete form to the demands of the oppressed communities, which could have served as a bridge to unite with the issues of other struggling communities in the state and beyond. Only a strong Left can be a bulwark against the divisive politics of ruling elites.

What we are witnessing today is an all-out looting of resources and increasing pauperization both in the majority as well as in the minority communities. It is only by uniting against this loot which benefits the nexus of corporates and elites within each community, that we can achieve not just the real integration of the people, but secure our future. In this context, it is imperative to stress the need for building solidarity across communities to ensure people’s control over resources in both the valley and hills, through concerted struggles against, both, the corporates and the elites within our communities.

The common people across communities in the North-East as well as those in mainland India are horrified by the continuing violence in the Manipur and are appealing for peace and justice for all. We must demand the immediate resignation of the present government, and call for power to be handed over to an interim all-party government, comprising representatives from all communities. We must demand the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to ensure peace in the state so that people can safely return to their villages and rebuild their homes and lives. We must demand the provision of ex-gratia compensation to those who lost loved ones, suffered injuries and loss of home, grain, livestock, and so on. It should also be ensured that the process of return, rehabilitation, and compensation is overseen by a panel of retired judges who know the region closely, and are appointed by the Supreme Court. We must also demand that the present Chief Minister and the members of those organizations who have indulged in violence should not be part of any peace process. Moreover, women should be given a prominent role in the peace process for it to remain a meaningful process.

We know that these steps will create a much-needed normalcy in the state, albeit a fragile one that will last only till the next crisis unfolds. While we need to devote ourselves selflessly to bringing immediate relief to the affected people across communities, for a lasting peace, we need to rebuild the social fabric anew in order to prepare people for future struggles for the safety of life, livelihood, and liberty. In solidarity!

Towards justice for all as a pre-condition for a lasting peace!!

First released on June 1, 2023 by:

North-East Forum for International Solidarity (NEFIS)